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Abstract 
This paper explores the philosophical foundation of 
Ricoeur‟s hermeneutics on meaning and truth. Husserl‟s 
phenomenology and Heidegger‟s existential 
phenomenology are used as points of reference to 
disentangle the complexity of Ricoeur‟s project which 
aims at self-understanding. Sets out from his critic on 
meaning and truth within phenomenological tradition, 
Ricoeur proposes and develops a new hermeneutical 
method. He places an emphasis on “the primacy of 
language” as a reference point to grasp self-
understanding. Accordingly, “the primacy of subject” in 
the construction of meaning and truth is considered to be 
relative. However, it does not suggest that Ricoeur 
disavows the position of subject altogether. Instead, 
Ricoeur rejects subject that is understood as self-
transparent. By stressing upon “the primacy of language”, 
Ricoeur shifts the focus of phenomenology from 
“intuition” to “mediation”; from “essence seeking” to 
“symbol interpretation”. Thereby, in formulating his 
concept of self-understanding, Ricoeur historicizes the 
subject, that is, subject is no longer understood in its 
essence, but rather, as constructed and created within 
language. 
Keywords: Phenomenology, Linguistic turn, Life-world, 
Mediation, Manguage, Being, Re-description  
 
* Gajah Mada University, Indonesia, Banawiratma, Duta Wacana 











The history of modern western philosophy, to some extent, can be 
viewed as the battle of ideas to seek the truth, even truth with 
capital “T”. Philosophers in each period attempts to build 
assumption and argumentation for their own justification. 
Nevertheless, one point is often missing in this kind of 
philosophical debate: that philosophical activity is entirely 
linguistic. One may call an idea as “an idea” when it is already 
articulated into language. Analogous to this, thinking is not all 
about a mental process, or even a rational activity, but more 
pointedly, it is a linguistic matter. Thinking is always verbal. It is 
language that enables us to think.1 As an Australian semiotician, 
Richard Harland, puts it in his rhetorical question: “How could 
ideas exist in the mind without words?”2 This is to say that without 
language, there is no thinking. 
This linguistic issue gained its popularity in philosophical 
discourse during the 20th century. This so-called linguistic turn3 
marked the emergence of new sensibility and radical shift in 
determining the role of language in philosophical discourse. 
Language is repositioned from instrumental function to 
constitutive function. It is a common understanding to see 
language as merely an instrument to deliver concepts or ideas 
about reality. “Linguistic turn” sheds new light to language. 
Language is regarded now as a constitutive element in 
understanding reality. The way we understand reality relies on the 
way we represent it. Reality exists because it is already represented 
through language. That is to say, our relation with reality is not 
direct. It is always mediated by language. Language enables us to 
connect with reality. What we see as a reality is nothing but kind of 
                                                          
1 Richard Harland, Superstrukturalisme: Pengantar Komprehensif kepada 
Semiotika, Strukturalisme, dan Postrukturalisme (Superstructuralism: A 
Comprehensive Introduction to Semiotics, Structuralism and Poststructuralism), 
trans. Iwan Hendarmawan, Yogyakarta: Jalasutra, 2006, 14.   
2 Richard Harland, Superstrukturalisme, 14. 
3Bambang Sugiharto, Posmodernisme: Tantangan Bagi Filsafat (Posmodernism: 
A Challenge to Philosophy), Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1996, 79 – 80 
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reality that has been mediated by language. Language is not only 
an instrument to grasp reality, but rather, it constructs the reality.  
One prominent theorist who promotes this “linguistic turn” project 
is Paul Ricoeur.4 It is important to note that Ricoeur‟s approach on 
linguistic is quite different from structuralist approach. 
Structuralism formulates linguistic issue with radical anti-
phenomenology approach, which underlines meaning as 
independent from subject.5 It derives meaning solely from the sign 
system. Whereas Ricoeur embraces hermeneutic-phenomenology 
agenda that serves as the route to self-understanding. 
Ricoeur‟s interpretation theory sets out from his critique to 
Husserlian idealist mode of consciousness, through which he 
further radicalizes phenomenology to hermeneutics. He criticizes 
Heidegger‟s phenomenological ontology, wherein meaning is 
conceived of as “concealing” itself. Taking this lead, Ricoeur moves 
interpretation to symbolic field.6 Indeed, language plays crucial 
role in Ricoeur‟s hermeneutics. If hermeneutics is to be defined as a 
process of interpretation that aims at self-understanding, this 
                                                          
4 During his study in university, the dominant philosophical discourse 
was phenomenology and existentialism. His hermeneutical theory was 
elaborated when he positioned as Professor of Philosophy at the 
universities in Strasbourg, Paris, and Chicago. Besides, he served as 
director for Center of Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paris during 
1970s to 1980s. See: Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of 
Minerva, Burlington: Ashgate,  2004, 1. 
5 Structuralism bases itself upon linguistic principles endorsed by 
Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure remarks that meaning is not derives 
from individual, but rather locates on difference existed in language 
system, or langue as he calls it. To illustrate language as a system, 
Saussure exemplifies with his well-known chess game analogy. In order to 
play this game properly, one has to understands its basic rule. Take for 
instance, knight is able to move two squares horizontally and one 
vertically (or vice versa). We can call it a knight simply because it moves 
in a different way with other chessman. Similarly with language, system 
of language precedes any actual speech. And meaning is determined by 
its position in a system. See: Richard Harland, Superstrukturalisme, 15 – 
17. 
6 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 15 – 16. 
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process will take place in and through symbolical field, through 
language. 
Before commencing this discussion, a brief explanation about 
Husserl and Heidegger‟s phenomenological project, particularly 
which gives insight to Ricoeur‟s hermeneutic - will be of much 
help. Ricoeur begins to build his theory from his critique to Husserl 
and Heidegger‟s phenomenological project. 
Critique to Husserl and Heidegger’s Phenomenology  
Edmund Husserl is arguably the key figure in phenomenology 
tradition. He introduces Transcendental Phenomenology; a new 
theory about consciousness and mode of knowledge. Husserl‟s 
main purpose is seeking for eidos or the essence of knowledge. To 
some extent, his very attempt is similar to Descartes‟ investigation.7 
Like Descartes‟, Husserl‟s phenomenological project is based upon 
„consciousness‟. Consciousness is determined as the foundation of 
knowledge. However, Husserl and Descartes‟ project is somewhat 
different. Both of them differ in how they treat consciousness as 
prima causa in their philosophical foundation. Descartes‟ 
philosophy considers consciousness as introspective, that is, as 
consciousness that recognizes itself. On the contrary, Husserl‟s 
consciousness is intentional. This means, consciousness is always 
consciousness about something. It should be emphasized, however, 
that the term intentionality used here does not refer to „character‟ 
as applies in common usage. It is not the kind of character that one 
might possess, such as being “shy” or “fierce”. In Husserl‟s context, 
intentionality refers to the consciousness itself. It is always directed 
toward an object. In this manner, Husserl attempts to break down 
Cartesian dichotomy between subject and object and between 
consciousness and reality. 
Husserl‟s phenomenological project might be best summarized 
under the jargon “back to the thing in itself”.8 Phenomenology, 
then, is an art to understand phenomena as self-manifestation of 
reality. Phenomena are the reality that shows itself in 
                                                          
7 Anton Baker, Philosophical Methods, Jakarta: Ghalia, 1984, 108. 
8 Andre Edgar & Peter Sedgwick, eds., Cultural Theory: The Key Concepts, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2002, 271 – 273. 
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consciousness. For Husserl, phenomenology is not only about 
epistemology, but also ontology. To this degree, Kantian 
dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is collapsed. 
Intentionality of consciousness, in Husserl‟s view, is the reality as it 
appears itself in consciousness. There is no reality without 
consciousness. Nevertheless, it does not refer to an idealistic 
standpoint which views reality as constructed by consciousness. 
But rather, reality derives its meaning in so far as consciousness 
persists. What has been called “an objective world” and “genuine” 
knowledge is inherently inseparable from subjective 
consciousness.9 In phenomenological perspective, „truth‟ is 
understood as the reality which shows itself in subjective 
consciousness; the truth is discovered in “any attempt at relating 
the conditions of the appearance of things to the structure of 
human subjectivity”.10 
Therefore, understanding and authentic experience can only be 
grasped through intuitive mode, by allowing the phenomenon to 
show itself in consciousness without any mediation. Authenticity 
appears itself directly and transparently (intuitive) to subject‟s 
consciousness. Intuition is kind of pure reflection which operates 
by directing itself toward an object in order to grasp theoria, or the 
true knowledge. In Husserl‟s phenomenology, intuitive knowledge 
is conceived as “a purification of the phenomenological field of 
consciousness from its spatio-temporal objectivity”.11 
Consciousness is understood as “self-contained system of being”.12 
Thought may reveal being directly and in transparent way. Based 
on this assumption, Husserl‟s phenomenology insists that 
philosophy is not a concept or interpretation of reality, but, reality 
in itself.13 
                                                          
9 Theodore de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, Boston: Martinus 
Nijhof, 1978, 398. 
10 Charles E. Reagan, The Philosophy of Paul Ricouer: An Anthology of His 
Work, Boston: Beacon Press, 1978, 76. 
11 Dermot Moran & Timothy Mooney, eds.The Phenomenology Reader, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002, 129. 
12 Theodore de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, 398. 
13 Anton Bakker, Philosophical Methods, 108. 
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In his second period, Husserl proposes another key concept in his 
phenomenology, namely Lebenswelt or life-world. It refers to 
everyday world which is experienced and comprehended by each 
individual. It is a horizon where primordial experience of 
individual with and inside its daily life transpires. It is called 
„primordial‟ because this experience has not been redefined by any 
scientific categories. Lebenswelt subscribes to the idea that one‟s 
encounter with the world is prior to any reflection to the world. It 
constitutes the world we live in and experience with, where there is 
no clear distinction between subject-object as suggested by 
scientific construction. From scientific construction point of view, 
the understanding of scientific-objective is applied onto daily life. 
But, long before it is interpreted by scientific method, in fact it is 
already experienced directly by individual. Scientific-objective 
understanding is simply an alternative to articulate this primordial 
experience. Thus, scientific-objective understanding is nothing but 
the interpretation of Lebenswelt.14  
Heidegger’s Existential Phenomenology 
Existential phenomenology is proposed and developed by 
Heidegger as a critical response to Husserlian phenomenology and 
scientific understanding in general (read: the worldview which 
tends to objectify and see things as instrumental). Heidegger‟s 
phenomenology is existential in a way that it is anchored on 
existence to explain reality, meaning, and truth. Heidegger argues 
that Husserlian phenomenology of knowledge and understanding 
is a-historical and its concept about self is trapped into pure 
transcendentalism, which he calls “immanent consciousness of 
truth”.15 Husserl urges to set aside and to suspend any cultural 
prejudices, whether it is in the naive or scientific forms. This is 
necessary in order to gain understanding, or in this case, to be able 
to grasp the essence of “things in themselves”, which is presumed 
to be universal and exceeds space and time. Heidegger, on the 
contrary, rejects Husserl‟s notion on subject and transcendental and 
considers it to be impossible. 
                                                          
14 Bambang Sugiharto, Posmodernisme: Tantangan Bagi Filsafat, 36 – 37. 
15 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996, 259. 
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Indeed, Heidegger does not begin with transcendental subject as 
Descartes or Husserl does. His subject is, rather, historical, a kind of 
subject that inhabits and bound to its daily life. Herein lays his 
difference with his predecessor as well as tutor, Husserl. Husserl 
intends to transcend temporality and particularity in order to grasp 
what he believes as universal essence. In stark contrast to this, 
Heidegger situates temporality and particularity as conditions of 
existence which enable understanding and truth. Thus, 
understanding is not located outside the world, due to the very fact 
that subject is always already in the world (being-in-the-world). 
Another interesting contrast, Husserl insists on detachment as a 
keyword to knowledge and understanding. While, on the other 
hand, Heidegger emphasizes engagement. Knowledge and 
understanding base itself upon concern and interest. However, 
kindly note that what he means by concern and interest is not any 
kind of self-interest. Instead, interest here is a „horizon‟ of meaning 
for an individual. To put it differently, reflection toward the world 
or reality is prior  to and become possible due to, the fact that we 
are part of it and have meaningful relationship with the world and 
reality that we come to represent.16 Actually, Husserl has 
considered this fact, but then he regards it as a prejudice that has to 
be suspended so that the reality might appear to consciousness as 
universal essence. 
Heidegger‟s assumption becomes a crucial attack to science that 
holds objectivistic-positivistic paradigm. Scientific paradigm relies 
on dualism, such as dualism of subject-object and fact-value. 
Following Heidegger‟s argument, that kind of idealism sounds less 
and less realistic. Take for instance, the dualism of fact and value 
that applied in social science. Scientists confirm to this dualism as 
firmly as a religious man believes that heaven and hell exist. To 
give an example, in our society date of birth is considered to be the 
most crucial fact of people‟s biography. One‟s birth date is recorded 
in exact manner, which consists of date, month, and year. The 
prevalence of such fact, however, cannot be generalized to every 
society. In other society, the question of date of birth might not be 
considered important to be put in one‟s biography; neither 
celebrating birthday nor classifying people based on age. Rather 
                                                          
16 Bambang Sugiharto, Posmodernisme: Tantangan Bagi Filsafat, 71. 
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than date of birth, perhaps the day of birth is more relevant to 
them. It may relate, for instance, to the belief of good or bad fortune. 
This instance shows that fact is oftentimes closely related to value; 
both are not considered contradictory. It cannot be fully separated 
from the horizon of meaning, and the difference is not as sharp as it 
is drawn by objectivistic-positivistic paradigm. 
Thematically, Heidegger‟s project shares common concern with 
western philosophy, which investigates the deepest meaning of 
reality, or as Heidegger calls it- a Being. The novelty of Heidegger‟s 
project, then, lies in his method. Through phenomenology, Husserl 
attempts to provide the new ground to philosophy as a rigorous 
science. Heidegger, instead, goes further by questioning such 
ambitious and optimistic project. Broadly speaking, both Husserl 
and Heidegger agree upon basic principle of phenomenology, 
which states that reality shows itself.  Nevertheless, the basic 
assumption they propose, separate them incisively. Husserl departs 
from intuition, while Heidegger starts from existence. If 
phenomenology is to be defined as an event where the essence 
discloses itself, Husserl claims that the essence discloses itself 
intuitively when the subject puts aside his disposition. In contrast 
to that, Heidegger argues that the essence will never appear or 
disclose itself apart from its existence. To put it differently, Husserl 
conceives meaning as transcendental, whereas Heidegger assumes it 
as entirely existential.   
Heidegger elaborates a new method on the meaning of Being in 
order to grasp the fundamental ontology of understanding.17 
Existence is the meaning of Being that conceals itself to us.18 
Understanding the essence of Being is impossible unless we 
analyze the basic existential condition that defines human (or 
Dasein, in Heidegger‟s term). From Heidegger‟s point of view, the 
basic condition of human is constituted by two primary facts, 
namely: existence and being-in-the-world.19 Through his existential 
analysis, Heidegger insists that human being is always anchored in 
history, bound to its temporality, and always already inhabited 
                                                          
17 John Richardson, Existential Epistemology: A Heideggerian Critique of the 
Cartesian Project, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, viii. 
18 Dermot Moran & Timothy Mooney, The Phenomenology Reader, 18. 
19 Kees Bertens, Filsafat Barat Dalam Abad XX, Jakarta: Gramedia, 1981, 150. 
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certain cultural milieu. We cannot talk about humans apart from 
the way they represent their selves and existence, which is 
mediated by language. One is able to talk about him/her self, and 
describes his deepest aspiration in so far as it is mediated by 
language. Language constitutes the existence of human being. 
Besides, it determines one‟s position in the world and even the way 
the reality discloses itself as meaningful to an individual. It is, so to 
speak, through and of language that Being reveals itself to 
subjectivity. 
Existential analysis is about how to interpret human through 
language. From this point, self-understanding moves from 
immediacy to interpretation. Understanding human cannot be 
directly, but rather, it has to be interpreted through which human 
existence reveals itself, that is through language. Heidegger argues 
that “life is about interpretation”. The truth, or the disclosure of 
Being through language, is therefore a hermeneutical event. In this 
way, phenomenology becomes hermeneutical activity because it 
involves interpretation of the meaning of Being. Yet, Heidegger 
differentiates the ontological status between Being and Dasein. Being 
discloses itself within Dasein, but it does not suggest that both of 
them are identical. The position of being is ambiguous though, as 
disclosure and closure. As Heidegger puts it, truth is aletheia. 
Ricouer and Primacy of Language 
Following Heidegger, Ricoeur criticizes the concept of 
transcendental-subject in Husserl‟s phenomenology. From 
Husserl‟s standpoint, transcendental-subjects is conceived of as the 
foundation of knowledge and truth. The intentionality of 
consciousness is moved into a subjective transparency of 
understanding. Therefore, Ricoeur concludes that Husserl‟s 
phenomenology tends to reduce itself to an idealism.20 And so does 
Husserl‟s intuitive method. With his intuitive method, subjectivity 
and knowledge is alienated from human existence; whereas 
initially the world is considered as the horizon of meaning to 
humans. As a correction to Husserl‟s transcendental-subject, 
Heidegger proposes the idea of human existence as being-in-the-
                                                          
20 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 16. 
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world.21 Through this concept, human being is not located at an 
empty space that transcends space and time, but on the contrary, it 
is viewed as already belong to particular horizon of meaning, a 
certain time and space. 
All this, then, implies hermeneutics of “finitude”. Ontologically 
speaking, “finitude” is related to temporal dimension of Being. 
And, one representation of human finitude takes form of historicity. 
The idea of historicity affects interpretation and meaning as 
follows: First, subjectivity and meaning is constructed in 
intersubjective relations. Second, Dasein or human existence is 
developed and constructed through language in intersubjective 
dialogue with „others‟. In short, being is being for others. Third, 
Dasein does not only disclose, but also conceals itself. Being 
constitutes a horizon of meaning that disclose and conceals itself, 
hence it is to be interpreted in and through language. 
From the perspective of hermeneutics of finitude, existential 
phenomenology reveals “the expanding of subject‟s horizon” as the 
significant implication of the interpretation. Besides, interpretative 
horizon which is widely open to the hermeneutic existential-
phenomenology constitutes a new position of language in the 
process of interpretation and meaning construction. Hence, 
language becomes the new field for philosophical investigation and 
interpretation of Being that relates to and takes place in symbolical 
space. 
In the perspective of hermeneutic existential-phenomenology, 
meaning relates to the capacity of Being in revealing the 
possibilities: “Being discloses itself through existence (Dasein) 
which understands itself through its own possibilities.”22 Or, as 
formulated further by Richard Kearney: 
 “Ricoeur emphasized the primacy of signifying 
intentionality. This new emphasis leads him to advance a 
general hermeneutics where phenomenology confronts its 
                                                          
21 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 16. 
22 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 1. 
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own limit – that is, where the intuition of essences ends and 
the interpretation of symbols begins.”23 
To sum up, human is no longer understood directly and 
transparently in terms of substance or essence, but through a 
“round about route” mediated through symbol. Symbolic world – 
in specific language – constitutes a field wherein humans “create” 
and reveal themselves. The answer to the very question of “What 
are we?” and “Who are we?” is to be pursued in and through 
language. 
Taking his clue from Husserl‟s phenomenology and Heidegger‟s 
existential phenomenology, Ricoeur advances his hermeneutical 
project. He concentrates mostly on the relation between existence 
and hermeneutics which base itself on “interpretation as a mode of 
being”. For Ricoeur, we are what we interpret to be. This idea is 
crucial indeed as a foundation to interpretation, that is, the project 
of meaning as “manifestation” and “projection”. If hermeneutics to 
be simplified as a matter of interpretation, as in phenomenology 
and existential phenomenology of Being,  the root and the horizon 
of existence, or Dasein, will become the starting point to move into 
the most crucial issue in hermeneutics. The interpretation of 
“meaning”  originates from the idea of finitude of human 
consciousness which is always in constant tension between the past 
and the future: “As Heidegger‟s phenomenological ontology 
clearly showed, consciousness is bound by a relation of belonging 
to past sedimentations and future projects of meaning [...]”24 
Ricoeur‟s hermeneutics of finitude, precisely, elaborates how the 
concept about meaning is contingent in the context of human 
existence. For him, the most fundamental hermeneutical problem 
lies in the fact that existence provides a mode of interpretation 
since, “life is the bearer of meanings so that understanding is made 
possible through interpretation of life”. Or, as the following 
hermeneutics maxim suggests: “life interprets itself”. This is 
equivalent to saying that interpretation is a mode of being. It is not 
one among many instrumental activities, but rather a fundamental 
activity which constitutes human existence.  
                                                          
23 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 13. 
24 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 16. 
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To comprehend this concept, we have to analyze the relations 
between „subject‟ and „the world‟ and how it influences our mode 
of understanding, as well as our interpretation. Here, world and 
contingency take the role as horizon of meaning and understanding 
to the subject. Being-in-the-world implies that subject always 
already sees the world from certain „perspective‟ and 
understanding. The world is never being as non-meaning. The term 
“world” in this context has specific meaning. Ricoeur himself 
formulates “the world” as “the most concrete horizon in our 
existence”.25 Heideggerian concepts on temporality and “practical 
world of life” are applied in Ricoeur‟s following argument: “Before 
objectivity, there is the horizon of the world; before the subject of 
the theory of knowledge, there is operative life”.26 The world 
initially exists as Lebenswelt, as a world of meaning, long before it is 
objectively defined in scientific term. In this sense, world becomes 
“the horizon” of all attitudes and understanding. 
As a critique to objectivism, phenomenology introduces the term 
“world horizon” to hermeneutics, which is the pre-given world 
that represents retrospective dimension of interpretation. The 
referential point of this retrospective dimension of interpretation is 
Ricoeur‟s critique to Husserl‟s transcendental subject. In Husserl‟s 
transcendental subject, meaning and truth is conceived of as self-
transparent. In this sense, the subject is assumed to have the 
capability to grasp the appearance of essence of object intuitively 
with no mediation needed. Subjective consciousness constitutes the 
very foundation of meaning.27 But, the idea of self-transparence 
and the immediacy of meaning is relativized by Ricoeur by 
embracing Husserl‟s idea of intersubjectivity. Meaning is no longer 
immanent in subjectivity, but rather situated in intersubjectivity 
and embedded into Lebenswelt. Lebenswelt, Ricoeur asserts, 
represents a pre-given world that denotes “the level of experience 
anterior to the subject-object relation”.28 In contrast to the principle 
                                                          
25 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, Northwestern University Press: 
Evanston, 1965, 193. 
26 Don Ihde,  The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, 
Evanston: Northwestern University  Press, 1974, 9. 
27 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 16. 
28 Don Ihde, The Conflict of Interpretations, 8. 
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of self-transparency, Ricoeur views the process of interpretation 
and meaning as indirect. It is indirect in a sense that it is mediated 
through others. Meaning originates and develops itself through 
„the others‟. The linguistic character of existential-phenomenology 
shows the intersubjective dimension of understanding to the extent 
that “we are constructed by language”. It relates to the fact that we 
construct our world intersubjectively through the preexisting 
worlds of others. As Ricoeur puts it, the world “[...] is always-
already-before and I come too late to express it”.29   
Ricoeur goes on to argue that our existence is characterized by 
historical horizon of language wherein language precedes our 
subjective consciousness. Our existence is indeed designed by 
language. The world appears as meaningful reality because 
language shows that it does. Due to language, nature transforms 
itself into culture, hence a “world of meaning”. This transformation 
continues to persist through language. It transforms the unknown 
into the known. What is meaningless becomes meaningful. Culture, 
or say “the world”, is simply an alternate name for nature (which is 
articulated and intelligible). We do not have direct access to the 
reality or the real, even to our very self, unless mediated by 
language. Thus, language is the most explicit manifestation of 
historicity and subjectivity. Anthropologically speaking, we are 
indeed a linguistic being. Ricoeur remarks: “We belong to language 
that has been shaped and formed by others before we arrive on the 
existential scene”.30 This is what constitutes the horizon of 
hermeneutical activity. 
Besides the historical horizon, language actually has another 
dimension, namely „transcendental‟ horizon. The seeking for 
meaning is encouraged by the human facticity wherein language 
plays a central role as transcendental medium for interpretation. 
The concept of “hermeneutics of finitude” will be used to describe 
the process of meaning construction. “Hermeneutics of finitude” 
implies that the understanding process is not direct. This means, 
meaning does not originate from subjective consciousness, it 
                                                          
29 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, 194. 
30 Paul Ricouer, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981, 145. 
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instead, derives from “the others”, which is produced through 
language. This mediation should be considered as social-historical 
text which is linguistically in nature. As a hermeneutical discourse, 
this idea shows the crucial transition from pure phenomenology 
that starts from consciousness to hermeneutics that begins with 
interpretation of symbol, or symbolical meaning. 
The aforementioned concepts have several implications. First, the 
heart of understanding moves from consciousness to language. 
Human‟s interpretation and the process of understanding do not 
base on consciousness, but on language. Language is an access 
toward (or, to explain) humans. To interpret humans is not to 
analyze their consciousness, but to interpret their symbolical 
expression. The question about self (about what are we and who we 
are) is to be answered through language. If Ortega Y. Gasset argues 
that human does not have any essence, but history,31 the very same 
expression can be applied in Ricoeurian hermeneutics; we can say 
that human does not have an essence, but language. The historicity 
of human crystallizes itself in language. Human is what s/he 
expresses in language. Second, truth is neither transcendental nor 
universal, it is purely existential. Truth is constructed through 
language, and language mediates between us and reality. Truth, 
however, is not a correspondence between mind and reality, but 
rather it constitutes our point of existing. Following this 
assumption, it would be better to understand the truth as an 
ongoing process of expressing and transforming the self. Meaning 
is not waiting somewhere “out there” to be found; it does not lie 
outside our articulation in language. Indeed, there are millions of 
possible meaning can be articulated. Language has million 
possibilities to create meaning. Thus, truth and meaning – thanks to 
the intervention of language – is the possibilities as well as the 
potentialities of existence.32 If interpretation of meaning in 
Ricouer‟s hermeneutics is to be defined as an event of interpreting 
meaning in and through language, interpretation is a creative and 
                                                          
31 Quoted with slight modification from Ernst Cassirer, Human and 
Culture: An Essay of  Human (Manusia dan Kebudayaan: Sebuah Esai tentang 
Manusia), Jakarta: Gramedia, 1987, 260. 
32 Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan, eds. An Interpretative Social Science: 
A Reader, Los Angeles: University California Press, 1979, 129. 
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transformative event. It “creates itself” in and through language; 
meaning, we transform ourselves as well during the interpretation 
process.  
Function of Language: Re-description 
In Existential-Phenomenological Hermeneutics‟ perspective, 
linguistic interpretation has its reference in the idea of the world. In 
the process of interpretation language works by deciphering the 
hidden signs of Lebenswelt or life-world and human existence. This 
kind of hermeneutics immediately criticizes semiologist‟s view 
which sees language as a closed system of signs, as believed by 
Ferdinand de Saussure.33  More than self-sufficient within its own 
linguistic structure, in this process of understanding, language 
operates in dismantling symbolic power, and thereby it elevates 
existing situation and textual order toward new modes of 
existence.34 This is to say that, the distinctive function of language 
is to re-describe reality in symbolic level. Language, “as signifying 
milieu, must be referred to existence”.35 Language has a 
transcendental ability to create new meanings to the given and 
present situations, to re-describe new awareness and experience 
that, in turn, brings new way of looking at things. 
Language, therefore, brings epistemology to ontology in two 
correlative senses. On the one hand, language brings interpretation 
to existence where our consciousness reaches the world, on the 
other; it discloses possible modes of being-in-the world as well. In 
this sense, for Ricoeur, “to interpret is to understand a double 
meaning”,36 namely to move beyond existing reality (disclosure of 
meaning), which is symbolic, but without losing the reference. The 
Heideggerian idea that „Being discloses itself‟ could not be placed 
                                                          
33 Charles E. Reagan, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 87. 
34 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 25. 
35 Don Ihde, The Conflict of Interpretations, 16. 
36 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and 
Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing 
House, 1992, 347. 
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in an immediacy of self-reflection but within and through linguistic 
mediation.37 The basic nature of language is to say about something. 
The deeper layers of meaning are then constructed through the 
discourse of text deciphered by language.38 The profound and 
distinctive function of language to „disclose‟ reality is actually not 
weakened by non-immediacy in constructing meaning:  “[…] 
Language itself (in some sense almost intersubjective consensus) 
offers a more valid claim to constitute the bedrock uncovered by 
meta-critical exploration than „methods‟ or „explanations‟ which 
operate at a higher or more derivative level of abstraction.”39 In 
terms of intersubjectivity, language generates intersubjective 
definition of truth that discloses „true knowledge‟.40 And, in terms 
of derivative level, we need to underline „meta-critical exploration‟ 
of language. This means that attention is paid to investigate the 
imaginative and creative power of language more than it is allowed 
in explanatory method found in scientific abstraction. The 
imaginative and creative powers of language are distinctively 
found in the analysis of metaphoric and narrative language. 
Through the analyses of metaphor and narrative, Ricoeur sees a 
„higher‟ derivative level of linguistic capacity; language has ability 
to bring new possibilities for imagination and vision. In other 
words, language leads the openness of consciousness to new 
understanding of human life and the world.41 Indeed, metaphor 
presents possibility rather than actuality.42 In such a way, metaphor 
provides „imaginative discourse‟ whereas imaginative discourse 
will “open new understanding more directly rather than 
descriptive and scientific statements.”43 This means that metaphor 
has the capacity to create meaning „closer‟ to reality. 
Besides, from the phenomenology of imagination, Ricoeur 
reconsiders the living vitality of symbolic power of language.  He 
observes that language articulates meaning not merely as an 
                                                          
37 Don Ihde, The Conflict of Interpretations, 17. 
38 Charles E. Reagan, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 91-92. 
39 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 359. 
40 Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, 159. 
41 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 351. 
42 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 352. 
43 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 352. 
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abstract mimesis of events in reality. Meaning is more than a 
„concept‟, that is, “meaning is not event to be abstracted”.44  To see 
the symbolic-interpretive power of language, Ricoeur elaborates 
the so-called „poetic language‟. Metaphoric language works by a 
kind of poetic image. In Ricoeur‟s analysis of poetic imagination in 
metaphoric language, it is explained that a poetic image contains 
insights that stimulate the ways of becoming which proposes decisive 
difference from the ways of existing. The process of becoming in 
poetic imagination gives a potential access for verbal expressions. 
Then, the verbal expressions exercise specific function to provide 
imaginative „catalyst‟ for a „becoming‟, namely becoming of our being 
in our mind. However, what distinctive here is that language has 
also a capacity to correlate “verbal potentiality and non-verbal 
actuality”,45 words and act. It is parallel with linguistic ability to 
break the rigid relations between words and the world. In other 
words, it presents an imperative description that is even beyond 
the description of „seeing as‟, beyond what realized as it is. This is 
because poetic language follows the path of the „reverberation‟ of 
the poetic image into the depths of existence”.46 Furthermore, to 
gain a deeper understanding, we must notice the following theory 
of phenomenology of imagination as reformulated by Richard 
Kearney: “The poetic image thus points to the very „depths of 
existence‟ where „a new being in language‟ is synonymous with „a 
growth in being‟ itself. It is because “there is poetical imagination 
that words dream being.”47  Thus in this sense, it is possible for 
language to incorporate productive connection between words and 
our being, imagination and transformation. 
Further, linguistics has the capacity to „reverberate‟ the zone of new 
possibilities in our being through the creative process of poetic 
imagination, namely to create firstly new inner expressions within 
language itself. This process demonstrates that „becoming in 
language‟ could also be becoming in the sense of „making possible‟ 
in our mind. This shows the capacity of language to express us by 
                                                          
44 Charles E. Reagan, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 103. 
45 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the 
Creation of Meaning in  Language, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1978, 215. 
46 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 215. 
47 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 53. 
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making us what it expresses. Here “expression creates being”.48 This is 
„linguistic effects‟ of interpretation and understanding. In such 
dialectical expression, language brings us to the depth of reality 
along with the growth of our own being. It is, at this point, that we 
are recreated by language. In the process of re-creation by 
language, “we discover reality itself in the process of being 
created”.49 So, language serves as a creative instrument to interpret 
meanings from the texts of life in the process of becoming in 
existence. As Ricoeur puts it: “Language in the making celebrates 
reality in the making”.50 It is in this sense that we can transform the 
world first as „ideality‟ under poetic imagination, and then it leads 
us into the symbolic „increase‟ of becoming in our being in the 
world. 
In terms of Heidegger‟s theory, our understanding is shaped by our 
mode of being, that is, by the structure of being-in-the world.51 And 
one of Heidegger‟s key philosophical concepts is that language is 
the house of Being. Language is the only way to understand our 
being and existence.  Thus, the relationship between mode of being 
and interpretation could be understood in terms of constructing the 
possibility of being through language. But, the rich reference for 
interpretation should come from human existence or being-in-the 
world. Following Heidegger‟s inspiration, according to Ricoeur, the 
distinctive function of language is to disclose Being by re-describing 
reality in new ways52 as a „potentiality-for-Being‟.53 In explaining 
how metaphoric language re-describes reality, Ricoeur uses 
Heideggerian vocabularies to correlate subjective consciousness 
and language. For Ricoeur, Heidegger‟s ideas of „state-of-mind‟, 
„Being-attuned‟ and „mood‟ in subjectivity are not merely 
„subjective‟, but rather, considered as ontology,54 namely, as a 
certain way of existing, a suggestive ontology for becoming. The 
                                                          
48 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, op.cit., p. 214-215 
49 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 53. 
50 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricouer: The Owl of Minerva, 50. 
51 Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, An Interpretative Social Science, 
129. 
52 Charles E. Reagan, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur 104, 108. 
53 Anthony C. Thieselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 351. 
54 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 352. 
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centrality of language can be seen here in that a becoming in 
language takes place first in such ontological reflection before a 
becoming in being.  Consequently, human world is a creative 
construction of language. The words become the world. Therefore, 
the function of language can also be explained  in Aristotelian term: 
to “present a creative poeiesis (making)”.55 
In the perspective of hermeneutic, language provokes the 
awareness of our being and reality „in the making‟, and this 
represents our modes of being. As a result, the re-description of 
reality by language signalizes a „reconstructive power‟ of human 
understanding and action (praxis) in the world as well.56 For 
Ricoeur, linguistics constitutes a key tool of hermeneutics, 
especially in correlation to textual model of interpretation. The 
nature of language, therefore, cannot be portrayed simply as the 
„picture of reality‟ as stated by Wittgenstein I. In Wittgenstein‟s 
point of view, the world and language constitute an absolute 
parallelism. In this regard, the valid language is the „positive 
language‟ representing its objective correspondence with reality.57   
Conclusion 
The shift from “consciousness” to “language” marks the shifts of 
phenomenology to hermeneutics. In Ricoeur‟s hermeneutical 
stance, language plays a significant part in constructing meaning 
and self-understanding. Through the primacy of language, key 
issues in modern western philosophy, such as subject and truth, are 
redefined. By insistence on language, the firm position of 
transcendental subject with its self-transparency is indeed 
historicized through language. Concrete subject is not the 
transcendental subject that transcends space and time, but rather, a 
historical subject that expresses itself in and through language. And 
to talk about truth: truth is no longer „an equation‟ between mind 
and reality, but rather, it is the process of expressing and 
transforming the self.  
                                                          
55 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 352. 
56 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 355. 
57 Anton Bakker, Philosophical Methods, 123. 
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